Report of the Union "COMMITTEE-2024"

"PSEUDO-ELECTIONS OF THE PSEUDO-PRESIDENT - 2024.

POWER SEIZURE DISGUISED

UNDER THE ELECTORAL PROCEDURE"

 

1. Analysis of the initial conditions under which pseudo-elections of the pseudo-president - 2024 take place

1.1. Russian pseudo-elections cannot be considered free and democratic because they do not initially comply with the international electoral standards.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules different from those provided by law, the rules of the international treaty apply.

International electoral standards are principles of international law relating to citizens' electoral rights, the organization, and conduct of elections.

A number of these standards have found direct reflection in the norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: the sovereign right of the Russian people to exercise popular sovereignty, including through free elections and referendums, the right of citizens to vote and to be elected, recognition in Russia of political diversity and multiparty system, the principle of separation of powers, autonomy of local self-government, universal principles of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret and periodically held voting (for example, Articles 3, 13, 32 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation).

Russian electoral law, in addition to the norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation directly subject to direct application, is based on the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in the Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation." Unfortunately, in recent years, this law has undergone numerous unconstitutional and blatantly discriminatory changes. For example, in terms of de facto arbitrary restriction of passive electoral rights, substitution of free public observation with forms of visibility of such "control" completely controlled by the ruling power group, infringement of the rights of candidates and mass media, excessive complication of previously relatively simple and understandable procedures, as well as expanding the opportunities for administrative discretion in the implementation of the electoral process.

During the presidential elections of the Russian Federation, a special federal law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation" is applied. This law establishes additional requirements for the election procedure but is generally based on basic legislation and has direct references to the norms of the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in the Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation" on a number of electoral procedures (for example, on appealing actions and decisions of election commissions). Accordingly, this law has also undergone a number of unconstitutional and blatantly discriminatory changes.

All changes to federal electoral legislation essentially have one goal: to conserve the position of the criminal group that seized power in Russia. To increase pressure on society and implement discriminatory and unconstitutional norms, changes have been made to the administrative and criminal legislation of the country.

Among the main sources of international standards in the field of electoral rights and freedoms of Russian citizens, the universal or universal electoral standards should be included first.

Universal international electoral standards are enshrined in the following documents: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, Universal Declaration on Democracy.

In addition, regional electoral standards should be taken into account: the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, the Resolution of the PACE on the Code of Conduct in Electoral Matters, the Resolution of the PACE on Restrictions on the Activities of Political Parties in Member States of the Council of Europe, the Resolution of the PACE on a Set of Recommended Norms for Conducting Elections, and of course, the Convention on Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights, and Freedoms in States - Participants of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Currently, the Russian authorities are actively pursuing a course of non-recognition of the specified norms of international law and drifting away from universally accepted guarantees not only of citizens' electoral rights but also of human rights in general.

 

1.2. The principle of stability of electoral law is not observed in Russia

Russian electoral legislation is constantly changing in favour of the ruling political elites. Moreover, often such changes are made directly before the elections to serve the interests of the group in power. The Russian parliament cannot currently be considered a representative body of the people, as it is essentially puppet-like and de facto "approves" all initiatives of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with the provisions of the Declaration adopted at the 15th meeting of the Council for Democratic Elections (Venice, December 15, 2005) and at the 65th plenary session of the Venice Commission (Venice, December 16–17, 2005) CDL-AD(2005)043, any reform of the election law, applicable to certain elections, must be carried out in advance to be truly applicable.

Key norms include, in particular:

- the electoral system itself, the norms concerning the transformation of votes into seats in electoral bodies;

- norms relating to the composition of electoral commissions or other body responsible for organizing elections;

- delineation of electoral districts and rules for allocating seats in electoral bodies among electoral districts.

Electoral district boundaries in Russia are constantly revised before each election. Recent notable examples include the 2021 State Duma elections and the 2024 Presidential elections.

The Federal Law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation" underwent significant changes immediately before the announcement of the elections: on November 14, 2023. And since the last presidential elections, it has been amended 11 times, and the Constitution of the Russian Federation has also been changed.

The key unlawful modification was the amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 2020, allowing the incumbent president Vladimir Putin to run for a third and fourth consecutive terms (fifth and sixth terms in total).

1.3. During Russian pseudo-elections, systematic mass abuse of administrative resources is allowed, which has become an integral attribute and "norm" of any electoral campaign - essentially part of state policy

Abuse of administrative resources includes, for example, the use of equipment (phones, cars, conference rooms, etc.), access to human resources (civil servants, officials) in government authorities and local self-government bodies, and is aimed at conducting election campaigns for pro-government candidates and the ruling party. Such abuses lead to inequality between candidates and parties.

The document from the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE in 1990 emphasizes the need for a "clear distinction between the state and political parties". Political parties must be provided with "necessary legal guarantees allowing them to compete with each other on an equal basis before the law and authorities".

Russian legislation distinguishes between material and human resources. But in practice, there is no direct requirement in Russia to prohibit the abuse of administrative resources as a whole. The Russian Federation only imposes a number of restrictions to prevent the use of state resources in favour of any political party competing in the elections. These legal norms are not complied with, creating a basis for mass abuses, which the ruling power actively exploits during elections.

In practice, in Russia, for many years, facts of such abuses have been recorded. For example, the OSCE/ODIHR notes in its report on the presidential elections on March 4, 2012, that "there was an evident mobilization of physical and administrative resources in support of Putin's campaign, which was observed by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission. In some regions, participants in electoral events reported that they were ordered by management to participate in the elections. Various levels of state institutions instructed their subordinate structures to organize and ensure the conduct of campaign events for Putin. Local authorities also used official mass media, such as local websites or newspapers, to support Putin's campaign." PACE, in a report on the same elections, recommends the introduction of "strict rules... concerning the use of administrative resources during campaign periods" (Report on Election Observation from April 23, 2012).

These recommendations were not taken into account, moreover, in the pseudo-presidential elections - 2024, for the first time in the financing of federal elections, the participation of regional and municipal authorities was allowed in financing assistance in the preparation and conduct of the presidential elections of the Russian Federation, including informing voters and additional remuneration for members of election commissions with decisive vote. Thus, the independence of election commission members, many of whom are often employees or officials of budgetary institutions and organizations, is effectively curtailed.

The presidential election campaign of 2024 includes all the listed violations on a national scale. The peculiarity of it is the complete inaction in preventing and eliminating such violations, both by the election commission system and by law enforcement and supervisory authorities. The entire system of state authorities and local self-government bodies in Russia actively participates in Putin's election campaign and contributes to his "election" as President of Russia.

1.4. Independent observation of Russian pseudo-elections has been eliminated, and its substitute does not fully comply with international standards

As of today, Russia completely lacks an institution for independent election observation.

In 2022, Federal Law No. 60-FZ introduced amendments to the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in a Referendum," which abolished the institution of members of election commissions with consultative votes (MCVs) in precinct, district, and territorial commissions. Essentially, this was a reprisal and a blow to independent election oversight because MCVs were the most effective in preventing falsifications and other violations, as they, by law, had the same rights as members of commissions with decisive votes, with minor exceptions mainly related to the right to vote when making decisions of the commission, issuing ballots, and working with other commission documentation. Competent independent MCVs often blocked most of the opportunities for electoral fraud by electoral commissions, identified the majority of violations by electoral commissions, and monitored the entire process of their work, which greatly irritated Putin's falsifiers, hence this institution of independent election oversight was destroyed.

Additionally, restrictions were introduced on the timing and number of observers sent (without the possibility of prompt replacement of observers). Observers were tightly tied to the specific precincts, as their appointment had to occur in advance, no later than three days before the voting day.

Special places were allocated for observers at polling stations, and their freedom of movement and normal observation of the actions of election commission members were restricted.

At the same time, "public" observation was effectively destroyed and replaced by fake pseudo-observation. Essentially, today in Russia, "public" observation in pseudo-elections is carried out by the authorities themselves, structures dependent on the authorities. And often the leaders and members of public chambers, as the main subject of election observation, simultaneously act as active participants in the election campaign of candidate V. Putin. The main task of such "public" observation is not to prevent violations during the electoral process, but rather to conceal them.

Representatives of the media are also significantly restricted in their rights to be present at polling stations during voting and vote counting periods. To reduce the number of media representatives and limit their opportunities to cover the course of voting, legislation introduced norms stating that only those who work in the media under an employment contract concluded no less than two months before the day of official publication of the decision on the appointment of elections can be representatives of the media.

Thus, existing legislative restrictions do not contribute to free and comprehensive independent observation, making it practically impossible.

1.5. Changes restricting the electoral rights of large groups of opposition-minded citizens violate human rights and are discriminatory, and are not in line with international electoral standards

Most changes to legislation adopted from 2018 to 2023 are discriminatory in nature.

Significantly affected in their electoral rights were citizens recognized as "foreign agents." This applies to participation in the work of election commissions, as well as campaigning and other support for candidates. In general, opportunities for public control were substantially reduced while opportunities for manipulation were increased. The adopted restrictions on passive electoral rights, as well as exclusions from them, do not comply with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In 2021, legislation established a ban on participation in any elections for individuals associated with the activities of so-called "extremist or terrorist organizations." Essentially, all members of organizations critical of the Russian government were potentially affected, and some were immediately deprived of passive electoral rights after the law was passed. This law was then referred to as the law against the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) because shortly before its adoption, this organization was recognized as extremist (fighting corruption in Russia is considered extremism by the Russian authorities).

The law stipulated that individuals who had worked in an organization for three years prior to its court-ordered recognition as extremist or terrorist could not participate in elections at any level, including founders and leaders (including heads of structural and regional units and their deputies), and the ban duration was five years.

Also, according to this law, within three years from the date of the court's decision on the liquidation or prohibition of the activities of an extremist or terrorist organization, individuals who were members or employees of such organizations in ordinary positions, who assisted in its work and were involved in its activities, could not participate in elections.

The law implies that involvement in extremist activities includes, among other things, statements in support of such organizations, for example, on the internet, transferring money to them, as well as other assistance, including within the framework of a single event.

Thus, another tool was created by the authorities to hinder the participation in elections of active opposition politicians.

1.6. Changes allowing pseudo-elections to be held in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine do not comply with international electoral standards and international law in general

In 2023, amendments to the electoral legislation were introduced to facilitate the Putin regime's conduct of pseudo-elections in the occupation Russian authorities in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories.

To achieve this, elections and referendums were allowed to be held under conditions of martial law, essentially legislatively providing for the possibility of voting at gunpoint in conditions of restriction of civil rights and freedoms.

Additionally, legislation provided for the possibility of creating polling stations outside the Russian Federation – so-called extraterritorial polling stations. By introducing this new form of voting, the legislator pursued several goals. Considering the reluctance of the absolute majority of residents of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories to collaborate with the occupiers and participate in Russian pseudo-elections, it was necessary to create the opportunity to "fabricate" any figures in the final voting protocols, both in terms of turnout and the results of the "expression of will". And the use of extraterritorial polling stations provided an excellent opportunity for this. To avoid bothering with "formalities", it was also allowed to vote at such stations to anyone with any identity document, including a passport of a Ukrainian citizen and any other documents.

Moreover, in violation of the principle of transparency of the activities of election commissions, it was allowed to conceal both the composition of the commissions themselves and the number of voters who can participate in the voting.

1.7. Changes allowing pseudo-elections to be held within three days are aimed at mass falsifications and do not comply with international electoral standards

Granting election commissions the opportunity to conduct a three-day voting period allowed the authorities to solve two "problems" at once.

Firstly, by holding voting on a working day – Friday, officials gained an excellent opportunity to organize forced controlled voting of their dependent working voters. This was particularly evident on September 17, 2021 – the first day of the three-day voting in the elections to the State Duma in St. Petersburg. Photos of hundreds of servicemen standing in lines at polling stations to vote circulated throughout Russia. A similar situation was observed across the country, albeit in less caricatured forms.

Secondly, members of election commissions and their falsification supervisors from administrations were given two nights for calm "work" with ballots stored in safe packages for the first time. Such "opportunities" are widely used throughout Russia for ballot stuffing or even complete replacement of the contents of safe packages. The level and quality of falsifications vary. Somewhere, political administrators pre-order special fake safe packages with a red ribbon that leaves no traces when opened. In this scheme, it is impossible to detect signs of falsification. And somewhere, they simply open the safe packages, change the contents, or insert prepared ballots and then reseal the safe packages with regular tape as if nothing happened. Signs of falsification are evident, but falsifiers are not particularly concerned because the higher election commissions and, moreover, the courts subsequently dismiss and suppress all complaints from observers, and "particularly knowledgeable" observers are simply removed from the polling stations with the help of the police if necessary.

Thus, three-day voting practically creates opportunities for mass falsifications that cannot be controlled by methods of public election observation.

1.8. The unconstitutionality of granting V. Putin the possibility of reelection for a 5th term is a direct violation of international electoral standards and the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 3 of the Federal Law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation," a citizen of the Russian Federation who has held the position of President of the Russian Federation for two terms or who is holding the position of President of the Russian Federation for the second term on the day of the official publication (announcement) of the decision to appoint the election of the President of the Russian Federation shall not have the right to be elected President of the Russian Federation. This provision elaborates on the provisions of Article 81, Part 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which stipulates that the same person cannot hold the position of President of the Russian Federation for more than two terms. The regulatory provisions cancelling this limitation for the incumbent President of the Russian Federation, introduced into legislation after amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020, are unconstitutional, illegal, and do not conform to the principles of a democratic society; they grossly violate the foundations of the constitutional system of Russia. According to the provisions of Article 136 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, amendments to Chapters 3 through 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are adopted in the manner provided for the adoption of a federal constitutional law and enter into force after their approval by the legislative authorities of no less than two-thirds of the subjects of the Russian Federation. The procedure for adopting a federal constitutional law is established by Part 2 of Article 108 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Thus, the procedure for amending the articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation relating to Chapters 3 through 8 is as follows: A bill is introduced by the person or group of persons provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. For example, a bill from the President of the Russian Federation; The bill must be approved by the State Duma by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies (there are 450 of them in Russia, that is, 300 deputies + 1 deputy = 301 votes for amending the Constitution); The bill must be approved by the Federation Council also by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the total number; Within 14 days, the President must sign and publish the bill; Parliaments of no less than two-thirds of the subjects of the Russian Federation (regions, territories, and republics within Russia) must approve this law. After that, the amendments to Chapters 3-8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation will be considered adopted. Consequently, the Constitution of the Russian Federation in this part will be amended. Compliance with the specified procedure is legally sufficient for amending Chapters 3 through 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, in violation of the above-mentioned constitutional provisions, stages not provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation were added to the process of amending the Constitution of the Russian Federation: - consideration of amendments by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation; - conducting a nationwide vote (a new form, not considered a referendum).

Thus, the applied procedure for amending the Constitution of the Russian Federation contradicted the norms of the Basic Law of the state and was introduced by a bill with the amendments themselves.

Furthermore, in violation of the provisions of Part 2 of Article 2 of the Federal Law "On the Procedure for Adoption and Entry into Force of Amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation," the amendments were proposed as a single list, and the voting was conducted as a single unit on all amendments. Russian legislation requires that amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which encompass interrelated changes to the constitutional text, be adopted by a single law reflecting the essence of each amendment. Thus, the adoption of amendments as a list, as it was done, violates federal legislation.

In accordance with Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the norms of international law are an integral part of the Russian legal system and take precedence over national law in case of discrepancies between the provisions of national laws and international treaties of the Russian Federation. The UN Charter, in its preamble, declares that the peoples signing it create conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be observed. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (adopted by General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970) establishes the principle of good faith performance of obligations by states in accordance with the UN Charter. In accordance with this principle, each state is obliged to perform in good faith the obligations it has undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter, international agreements, universally recognized principles, and norms of international law. In cases where obligations arising from international agreements conflict with the obligations of UN members under the UN Charter, precedence is given to the obligations under the Charter. According to the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1975 (Section X), participating states undertake to faithfully fulfill their obligations under international law, including those arising from universally recognized principles and norms of international law, as well as those arising from relevant international law treaties or other agreements to which they are parties, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, including the right to establish their laws and administrative rules.

Thus, in accordance with national legislation and its international obligations, Russia has agreed to establish the principle of the primacy of international law and universally recognized principles of international law over national law. As noted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the constitutional amendments adopted in 2020 represent the most extensive and significant revision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 ever conducted (interim conclusions in July 2020 and final conclusions in March 2021).

In relation to the procedure for adopting amendments, the Venice Commission has drawn the following conclusions:

 

1. The speed at which the process of preparing such extensive amendments was conducted did not correspond to the depth of the amendments' content, especially considering their impact on society. It was noted that there was practically insufficient time for proper consultations with civil society before the amendments were adopted by parliament.

 

2. Due to the procedure without using a Constitutional Assembly, the amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation were effectively adopted after both chambers of the parliament and the parliaments of the subjects of the Russian Federation voted on them. According to Article 136 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the amendments should have come into force.

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3. The specially introduced additional stages in the form of a nationwide vote and the examination of the constitutionality of the amendments by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation were not legal obstacles to the entry into force of the amendments. In conditions of the rule of law, it is inappropriate to introduce a new type of referendum on a specific revision of the Constitution.

 

4. The inclusion of these additional stages in the procedure for amending the Constitution of the Russian Federation conflicts with Article 16 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, aimed at protecting the "foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation."

 

5. Russian legislation requires that only amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which cover interconnected changes to the constitutional text, would be adopted by a single law.

 

Thus, recognizing the legitimacy and constitutionality of the procedure for amending the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020 undermines the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation.

 

Furthermore, as noted in its final conclusion, the Venice Commission, these amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation:

 

1. Disproportionately expanded the powers of the President of the Russian Federation. At the same time, some mechanisms of checks and balances originally provided for in the Constitution of the Russian Federation were eliminated.

 

2. The exclusion regarding the term of office ("resetting"), which is ad hominem applicable to the incumbent and former Presidents of the Russian Federation, contradicts the logic of the adopted amendment, limiting the President's mandate to two terms.

 

3. The boundaries of the president's immunity have been significantly expanded. The rules for the impeachment procedure have been significantly complicated. Serious questions arise regarding the accountability of the President.

 

4. The President has acquired additional powers. The transition of powers from the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation to the President has been implemented.

 

5. In aggregate, all the amendments essentially violate the principle of the separation of powers.

 

It is important to understand that term limits are intended to protect democracy from turning into de facto dictatorship. Moreover, term limits can strengthen democratic society as they impose the logic of political transition as a predictable event in public affairs. They can be "important mechanisms of protection against the winner-takes-all politics."

 

In light of the comparative analysis of the constitutions of 58 countries conducted by the Venice Commission experts, the abolition of the restriction on the reelection of the president represents a setback in terms of democratic achievements, at least in presidential or semi-presidential systems.

 

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted in Resolution No. 2519 of October 13, 2023, that the extremely long periods of Putin's tenure in office in the Russian Federation and the excessive power he possesses have de facto turned the Russian Federation into a dictatorship, posing a threat to international peace and security.

The Assembly notes that Vladimir Putin has been in power continuously as President or Prime Minister since 2000. Amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and other legislative acts adopted in July 2020 allow him to remain president until 2036, when he will be 83 years old. The resolution also points out the increasing cruelty of repression against internal opponents and the beginning of an aggressive war against Ukraine.

 

The absence of a system of checks and balances in power in the Russian Federation, such as a strong parliament, judiciary, independent media, free press, and active civil society, is mentioned.

 

PACE agreed with the conclusions of the Venice Commission. It was separately mentioned that ad hominem departure from the maximum terms of the incumbent President of the Russian Federation contradicts both Russian constitutional law and the principles of international law.

 

1. The changes were adopted under a special expedited procedure not provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The regular procedure requires convening an assembly and the adoption of special laws introducing amendments on various proposed changes, rather than a single block vote on all amendments. Instead, a special law introduced a new sui generis procedure. Under this procedure, the President requested the opinion of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the law amending the Constitution, which was adopted within seven days. Subsequently, a nationwide conference was held, which does not fall under the applicable strict procedural requirements for referendums.

 

2. The conclusion of the Venice Commission, which considered that the new ad hoc procedure used to amend the Constitution of the Russian Federation creates an obvious contradiction with Article 16 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which protects the "solid foundations of the constitutional system" of the Russian Federation, was fully endorsed.

 

3. Decisions to change or repeal presidential term limits should be reviewed, as they have a significant impact on the stability of the country's system and trust in the electoral process. In the long term, reform of these provisions may affect the quality and resilience of democracy.

 

4. Constitutional amendments strengthening or expanding the powers of state bodies (if adopted) should only apply to future holders of power, not to the current ones.

 

5. Thus, the incumbent president benefits from these changes. The abolition of presidential term limits in favour of Putin and Medvedev undermines not only the norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation but also established principles of international law.

 

2. Violations committed in favour of candidate Putin during the signature collection

 

During the collection of signatures in support of candidate Putin, mass violations of electoral legislation were committed, hindering Putin's registration as a candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation.

 

At the initiative of the "Committee-2024" Association, from January 3, 2024, to January 26, 2024, 320 complaints were filed with the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation by Russian citizens in accordance with the law, regarding serious violations of electoral legislation committed during the collection of signatures and campaigning in support of candidate Putin.

 

All complaints were officially registered by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

 

Each complaint contained evidence of serious violations of electoral legislation committed during the collection of signatures and campaigning in support of candidate Putin in 70 regions of the Russian Federation, including:

 

1. Participation of state authorities in collecting signatures of voters in support of Putin.

2. Participation of local self-government bodies in collecting signatures of voters in support of Putin.

3. Participation of management bodies of organizations of various forms of ownership, and in particular, massive participation of budgetary institutions in collecting signatures of voters in support of Putin.

4. Participation of members of electoral commissions with decisive voting rights in collecting signatures in support of Putin.

5. Mass collection of signatures in support of Putin at workplaces.

6. Unlawful campaigning in support of Putin.

7. Financing of expenses related to the conduct of the electoral campaign of candidate Putin, in addition to the electoral fund of this candidate.

 

The list of violators of electoral legislation who participated in the illegal collection of signatures and unlawful campaigning for Putin is impressive.

 

Special attention is deserved by the facts of open participation of members of electoral commissions in Putin's electoral campaign.

During the signature collection in support of Putin, members of the electoral commissions actively participated. For example, in St. Petersburg, the chairpersons of the precinct electoral commissions – Evgeny Pospelov, chair of PEC No. 1364, and Pavel Mikhailov, chair of PEC No. 1363, were involved in this.

 

Illegal propaganda for Putin was conducted by the Territorial Election Commission of the Liskinsky District of the Voronezh Region directly on its official account on the social network "VKontakte."

 

Furthermore, the Chairperson of the Central Election Commission of Udmurtia, Svetlana Palchik, is a member of the Udmurt Regional Electoral Headquarters of candidate Putin and even serves as the deputy head responsible for working with the electoral commissions!

 

The facts of members of electoral commissions participating in Putin's campaign are known in other regions as well, indicating the complete illegitimacy of the entire Russian electoral system and its criminal nature.

 

Additionally, attention is drawn to the mass participation of Russian governors in Putin's electoral campaign.

 

For instance, the Head of Udmurtia, A. Brechalov, simultaneously leads the Udmurt Regional Electoral Headquarters of candidate Putin, and this "headquarters" simply duplicates Brechalov's administration and consists entirely of government officials.

 

Other governors, such as the governor of the Astrakhan Region I. Babushkin, the head of the Chechen Republic R. Kadyrov, the governor of the Penza Region O. Melnichenko, and the governor of the Irkutsk Region I. Kobzev, were also noticed in illegal propaganda and participation in signature collection.

 

These facts provide ample grounds to believe that all governors are using their powers in violation of the law to facilitate the election of candidate V. Putin as President of the Russian Federation.

 

To illustrate the scale of the involvement of authorities, budgetary institutions, and enterprises of various forms of ownership in illegal support of candidate Putin, let's provide a series of examples illustrating the extent and geography of violations. Federal government bodies and their territorial bodies (just a few examples): The Federal Service for Alcohol Market Regulation; the Department of the Federal Bailiffs Service for the Kostroma Region; the Federal State Budgetary Institution "Main Bureau of Medical and Social Expertise for the Irkutsk Region" of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation; the Interregional Territorial Administration of the Federal Service for Transport Oversight for the Northwestern Federal District; the Branch of the Federal State Budgetary Institution Russian Agricultural Center for the Karachay-Cherkess Republic; the Territorial Fund of Compulsory Medical Insurance of the Sakhalin Region; the Federal State Budgetary Institution "Main Bureau of Medical and Social Expertise for the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)"; Government bodies of the subjects of the Russian Federation (several examples in addition to those already listed above): the Supreme Council of the Republic of Khakassia; the Ministry of Education of Kuzbass; the Oryol Regional Council of People's Deputies; the Control and Accounts Chamber of the Zabaykalsky Krai; the State Labor Inspection of the Belgorod Region; the Small Business Support Fund of the Khabarovsk Krai, and others.

- Local self-government bodies: Magadan City Duma, Administration of the Leshukonsky District of the Arkhangelsk Region, Ivanovo City Duma, Administration of the Pavlovsky District of the Voronezh Region, Administration of the Kanashsky District of the Chuvash Republic, Administration of the Verkhneuralsky District of the Chelyabinsk Region, Council of Deputies of the Iskitimsky District of the Novosibirsk Region, Administration of the Staroslavkinsky Rural Settlement of the Maloserdobinsky District of the Penza Region, Administration of the Dzerzhinsky District of the City of Perm, Administration of the Aleut Municipal District of the Kamchatka Krai, Administration of the Bolshesafoninsky Rural Settlement of the Nazivaevsky District of the Omsk Region, Administration of the Zaluzhensky Rural Settlement of the Liskinsky Municipal District of the Voronezh Region, Council of the Padansky Rural Settlement of the Medvezhyegorsky District of the Republic of Karelia, Administration of the Bystriansky Municipal District of the Kamchatka Krai, Administration of the Municipal Formation "Enotaevsky Municipal District of the Astrakhan Region", Administration of the City of Sarapul of the Udmurt Republic, Administration of the Duminichsky District of the Kaluga Region, Duma of the Lebyazhyevsky Municipal District of the Kurgan Region, Council of Deputies of the Bagrationovsky Municipal District of the Kaliningrad Region, Achinsk City Council of Deputies of the Krasnoyarsk Krai, Administration of the City of Minusinsk of the Krasnoyarsk Krai, Assembly of Deputies of the Nagaybaksky Municipal District of the Chelyabinsk Region, Sakhalin Regional Duma, Council of Deputies of the City of Tatarsk of the Novosibirsk Region, Administration of the Urban Settlement "Pushkinogorye" of the Pushkinogorsky District of the Pskov Region, Vladivostok City Duma, Kurgan City Duma, Armavir City Duma of the Krasnodar Krai, Duma of the Arsenyevsky Urban District of the Primorsky Krai, Mostovskaya Rural Administration of the Verkhnyaya Pyshma Municipal District of the Sverdlovsk Region, City Duma of the City of Pyatigorsk of the Stavropol Krai; Petrovsk-Zabaykalsky City Duma of the Zabaykalsky Krai; Bolshoy Kamen City Duma of the Primorsky Krai; Administration of the Dolinsky Municipal District of the Sakhalin Region; Duma of the Cherdynsky Urban District of the Perm Krai; Administration of the City of Zaozerny of the Rybinsk District of the Krasnoyarsk Krai; Rasskazovsky City Council of People's Deputies of the Tambov Region; Territorial Administration of the Barvikha Administration of the Odintsovo Urban District of the Moscow Region; Council of Deputies of the Municipal Formation "Yaroslavsky" of Moscow City, Council of Deputies of the Naro-Fominsky Urban District of the Moscow Region, Council of Deputies of the Ordzhonikidzevsky District of the Republic of Khakassia, Administration of the Kalininsky District of Chelyabinsk, Administration of the City of Rybinsk of the Yaroslavl Region, Council of Deputies of the Nyazepetrovsky Urban Settlement of the Chelyabinsk Region, Council of Deputies of the Sergiev Posad Urban District of the Moscow Region, Administration of the Municipal Formation "Kurilovsky" of the Sobinsky District of the Vladimir Region;

- Budgetary educational institutions: Kazan Innovative University named after V.G. Timiryasov, Gorno-Altai State University, Yugorsk State University, Ivanovo State University named after I. I. Ivanov, Regional State Budgetary Professional Educational Institution "Artemovsky College of Service and Design" of the Primorsky Krai, Municipal Budgetary General Education Institution Secondary School No. 10 named after A.V. Ivanov in the Chegdomyn village of the Khabarovsk Krai; Municipal Budgetary General Education Institution "Pokrovskaya Basic General Education School" of the Peremyshlsky District of the Kaluga Region; Municipal Budgetary General Education Institution "Elizovskaya Secondary School No. 8 named after V.N. Orlovsky" in the town of Elizovo of the Kamchatka Krai; Chita Branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (Chita Branch of RANEPA); Republican State Budgetary Professional Educational Institution "Karachay-Cherkess Pedagogical College named after Umar Khabeckov"; Karachay-Cherkess Republican State Budgetary Professional Educational Organization "Agricultural and Technological College"; Municipal Budgetary Institution "Sports School of Football and Athletics" of the Derbent Urban District of the Republic of Dagestan, Municipal Budgetary General Education Institution "Boarding School No. 7" of the city of Derbent of the Republic of Dagestan; Municipal Budgetary General Education Institution – Secondary General Education School of the Khurikau village of the Mozdok District of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Municipal Budgetary Preschool Educational Institution "Zhuravushka Kindergarten" of the Nevon Settlement, Ust-Ilimsky District, Irkutsk Region;

- Medical and social budgetary institutions: L.I. Shvetsova Rehabilitation Center for the Disabled (Moscow), St. Petersburg State Budgetary Healthcare Institution "Dental Polyclinic No. 15", Municipal Budgetary Cultural Institution "Druzhayevsky Settlement Cultural and Leisure Center", St. Petersburg State Budgetary Healthcare Institution "Specialized Children's Home No. 3 (Psychoneurological) of the Frunzensky District", Administration of the State Budgetary Institution of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) "Chulman House-Boarding House for the Elderly and Disabled", State Budgetary Institution "Basic Republican Children's Social Rehabilitation Center "Rainbow" of Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, State Budgetary Healthcare Institution "Primorsky Krai Perinatal Center", State Budgetary Institution of the Novosibirsk Region "Center for Social Support of the Population" of the Zdvinsky District, State Budgetary Institution of the Kaluga Region "Spas-Demensk House-Boarding House for the Elderly and Disabled", Municipal Budgetary Institution "Complex Center for Social Services of the Population" of the Kuznetsk District of Novokuznetsk, State Budgetary Healthcare Institution of the Tyumen Region "Regional Hospital No. 9" (Vagay Village);

 

- Enterprises of various forms of ownership: Cheboksary Tractor Plant CJSC "PROMTRACTOR", Municipal Unitary Enterprise "Water Supply Company of the Khabarovsk Municipal District of the Khabarovsk Krai", State Unitary Enterprise "St. Petersburg Metro"; Omsk Region Water Pipeline Joint Stock Company; Babayevo Locomotive Depot - a structural unit of the Oktyabrskaya Traction Directorate of the Traction Directorate - a branch of the Open Joint Stock Company "Russian Railways"; Salekhard Plant LLC YANAO, Turtasskoye Linear Production Management of Main Gas Pipelines (KS-8) - a branch of LLC "Gazprom Transgaz Surgut", Vurnary Plant of Mixed Preparations, Chuvash Republic, Municipal Unitary Printing Enterprise "FORMAT", Municipal Unitary Enterprise "Water Supply Company" of Adygeysk.

 

None of the 320 complaints regarding violations of electoral legislation during the collection of signatures and campaigning in support of Putin were considered by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. However, the specific facts of violations listed in these 320 complaints lead to the conclusion that the signatures of at least 75,000 Russians collected illegally in support of Putin should be deemed invalid, which constitutes more than 5% of the total number of signatures required for a candidate nominated by self-nomination. Therefore, such a number of signatures exceeds the minimum threshold, according to subparagraph 3 of paragraph 2 of Article 39 of the Federal Law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation", and results in the refusal to register this candidate.

Additionally, our monitoring of the social network "VKontakte" has shown that in support of Putin's nomination for the elections and with calls to gather signatures for him in this social network, an average of 4 new publications appeared every minute from various government agencies and institutions, officials, and private user accounts. Interestingly, the time of day had almost no effect on the frequency of such publications. This circumstance indicates that a large-scale centralized active effort was made to populate this social network, controlled by the Russian government, with unlawful agitation for candidate Putin.

 

Thus, during the electoral campaign of candidate Putin, we have identified the following types of violations:

 

1) Use of advantages of official and service position by officials of state authorities and local self-government bodies, as well as bodies of management of budgetary institutions and organizations of other forms of ownership;

2) Violations during signature collection;

3) Violations of campaigning rules;

4) Various forms of coercion of voters to participate in signature collection;

5) Violations in the financing of the electoral campaign.

3. Illegal registration by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation of candidate Putin.

 

Despite the mass nature of the violations, including those committed with active participation of government authorities and local self-government bodies, state and municipal institutions, and their officials, the Central Election Commission of Russia (CEC RF) refused to consider complaints against Putin in the manner prescribed by law. Even at the meeting where the decision to register Putin as a candidate was made, information about violations and received complaints was not disclosed.

 

Instead of considering complaints on their merits, the CEC RF chose the following criminal scheme to conceal the facts of violations.

 

All complaints submitted in violation of the established legal procedure were forwarded to subordinate election commissions.

 

Subordinate election commissions, in an illegal manner, informally contacted violators and asked them to remove publications and hide traces of violations.

 

Afterward, practically all illegal publications against which complaints were filed on social networks and on the websites of government authorities were deleted by the violators.

 

After some time, officials of these subordinate election commissions provided illegal responses claiming the absence of facts of violations and the impossibility of taking measures in this regard.

 

This criminal practice, employed by the Russian electoral system, was aimed at obstructing the recording of violations in favour of Putin, concealing these violations, and helping violators avoid accountability.

 

Moreover, during the verification of signatures submitted by the candidate for registration, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation should have verified compliance with the prohibitions established for signature collection by paragraph 7 of Article 36 of the Federal Law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation", which:

- The participation of government authorities, local self-government bodies, management bodies of organizations of all forms of ownership, institutions, members of election commissions with decisive voting rights in collecting signatures of voters is not allowed;

- It is prohibited during the signature collection process to coerce voters to put their signatures and reward them for it in any form, as well as to collect signatures at workplaces, during the distribution of salaries, pensions, allowances, scholarships, other social payments, or the provision of charitable assistance. Failure to comply with the established prohibitions renders the signatures presented in support of the candidate invalid. In accordance with subparagraph 9 of paragraph 11 of Article 38 of the Federal Law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation," signatures of voters collected in violation of the requirements provided for in paragraphs 7 of Article 36 of the Federal Law "On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation" are considered invalid.

Therefore, due to the established work of the CEC RF to conceal mass organized violations of electoral legislation by the Russian authorities, the Association "Committee-2024" also addressed the CEC RF with a collective and public statement on January 22, 2024, regarding the inadmissibility of registering Putin as a candidate in these pseudo-elections.

This collective statement indicated all the complaints filed by us and listed the documented violations of the law in favour of candidate Putin.

On January 27, 2024, an addition to the statement of January 22, 2024, was also submitted, which additionally reported violations recorded during the period from January 22 to January 27, 2024.

However, the CEC RF completely ignored both the complaints filed and the statement of refusal to register and its addition. Based on the statement of January 22, 2024, and the addition of January 27, 2024, the CEC RF simply did not make any decision, did not consider it at a meeting in the prescribed manner, completely ignoring both the arguments of the appeal and the fact of the appeal itself.

Additionally, the CEC RF did not respond in any way to the facts of participation of members of election commissions in collecting signatures for Putin and the work of his regional election headquarters.

 

4. Inaction of the Russian law enforcement system in response to illegal actions by the CEC RF.

 

Regarding the facts of violations of electoral legislation due to the active and mass participation of Russian government authorities and local self-government bodies, state and municipal organizations, enterprises, and institutions, as well as their officials in collecting signatures for candidate Putin, besides submitting complaints to the CEC RF, the Association "Committee-2024" addressed the law enforcement agencies of Russia: the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.

 

In response, the Russian "law enforcement" system also demonstrated complete disregard for the facts of violations and complicity in their concealment, thereby assisting in concealing the facts of crimes by members of Russian election commissions.

 

For each instance of inaction by members and employees of the CEC RF, which manifested in the non-examination of complaints about violations of electoral legislation in accordance with the law, in gross violation of the rights of applicants to have their appeals considered by government authorities, as well as in concealing violations and helping violators evade accountability, we filed statements with the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for initiating criminal cases against officials of the CEC RF under the following articles:

 

- Article 141 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - obstruction of the free exercise of electoral rights by a citizen, as well as obstruction of the work of election commissions,

- Article 285 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - abuse of office,

- Article 286 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - actions by an official clearly exceeding their powers and resulting in significant violations of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens or organizations or the legally protected interests of society or the state,

- Article 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - negligence is considered failure or improper performance of official duties by an official due to dishonest or negligent attitude towards them, if this resulted in causing significant damage (more than 1.5 million rubles) or significant violations of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens or organizations or the legally protected interests of society or the state) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

 

However, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation did not make any procedural decisions on any of the statements, no investigations were conducted, no criminal cases were initiated, and none of the violations of legislation were investigated as required by the norms of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.

The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, to which we appealed regarding the inaction of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, itself abstained and, in violation of the law, redirected all our complaints to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation within the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.

 

Thus, the Russian law enforcement system and the entire system of state power in Russia demonstrated their complete illegitimacy, criminality, and commitment to assisting the acting President in carrying out a de facto power seizure in the country.

 

This is further confirmed by the fact that after the Association "Committee-2024" began actively documenting mass violations of electoral legislation in favor of candidate Putin, the CEC RF, the law enforcement system of the Russian Federation, together with the Federation Council, attempted to discredit the initiators of this activity - activists of the Association "Committee-2024".

 

At a meeting on January 5, 2024, during meeting No. 147 of the Central Election Commission of Russia, Deputy Chairman of the CEC RF, Bulayev, committed illegal actions against the Chairman of the Association "Committee-2024", Sergey Antonov, violating legislation on personal data by publicly disseminating information about the private life of a person who had previously applied to the CEC RF with complaints about violations of electoral legislation.

 

Later, on February 8, 2024, at an expanded meeting of the Commission of the Federation Council on the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Senator Klimov referred to the absolutely lawful actions of the activists as "...malicious attempts of enemies who are incapable of preventing our country from living by its own laws!". Subsequent statements by representatives of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation contained direct accusations against the Association "Committee-2024" of activities aimed at obstructing the work of Russia's electoral system.

 

On February 22, 2024, the Chairman of the Association "Committee-2024", Sergey Antonov, was brought before the Industrial Court of the city of Izhevsk on administrative charges under a political article - for participation in the activities of an undesirable organization.

Conclusions:

 

1. Russian pseudo-elections do not comply with international electoral standards and cannot be considered free and democratic. As a result of such pseudo-elections, democratic transfer of power is fundamentally impossible, and the Russian people are deprived of the constitutional right enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation to be the sole source of power and the bearer of sovereignty.

 

2. The Russian electoral system and law enforcement system do not fulfill the functions entrusted to them by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal legislation regarding the organization of free and democratic elections, as well as ensuring the supremacy of the law and its strict observance by all participants in the electoral process. On the contrary, they use their existing powers to maintain the power of the incumbent President of the Russian Federation, Putin, and are willing to commit any crimes for this purpose.

 

3. The illegal registration of Putin as a candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation, despite massive violations of the law on his part, became a crime against the people of Russia.

 

4. Putin, who is running for the position of President of the Russian Federation for the fifth time, has no right to participate in the elections.

 

5. The participation of the entire system of state authorities and local self-government bodies in Putin's electoral campaign, together with active support from the Russian electoral system and the criminal inaction of law enforcement agencies, means that these pseudo-elections represent not a democratic electoral procedure but a forcible seizure of power in the country.

 

6. In addition to the direct forcible seizure of power within Russia, these pseudo-elections are also aimed at strengthening the Russian occupation regime in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

 

7. Any participation of Russian citizens in such pseudo-elections will contribute to the strengthening and legitimization of the personal dictatorship of the President of the Russian Federation, Putin.